The Great Recession of 2007-2008 saw the largest period of economic downturn since the Second World War or the Great Depression of the 1930s. Recessions, however, tend not to have a significant impact on population health. Rather it is how society and governments respond to a recession that has a larger impact on their populations. The dominant political response to the Great Recession was the introduction of austerity programmes aimed at reducing the size of the state. In this Commentary, I briefly review the state of evidence on the changes in population health during austerity. Although the negative impact of austerity on overall population health has been well documented across Europe, there remains a paucity of evidence on within-country differences in health. The slowing down of improvements in life expectancy, correlated to the level of austerity, raises uncomfortable questions as to whether we are beginning to transition from the era of consistently improving population health to a new age characterised by an instability in population health largely dictated by the social and political determinants of health.
The Great Recession of 2007-2008 saw the largest period of economic downturn since the Second World War or the Great Depression of the 1930s. The dominant political response was to reduce state spending through cutting back social insurance programmes, such as welfare entitlements or health care provision. The arguments put forward for austerity were to encourage economic growth through stabilising public finances and focusing investment on the private sector.
Both the recession and the subsequent period of austerity were large-scale societal events that affected whole populations (to varying degrees) and each had the potential to affect trends in population health. What became evident was that the impact of the recession on population health was not as severe as that due to austerity. Some outcomes such as suicide (particularly middle-aged men) increased during the recession in many countries, including Greece . However, few other changes in population health were observed consistently across countries in large quantities. This is nothing new. Stuckler and Basu [5] demonstrated that during previous recessions populations did not die in large numbers because the economy had faltered in the short term. In fact, paradoxically, recessions can actually be beneficial for population health (although I would not recommend them as a policy intervention). For example, in the USA, vehicle-related deaths fell during (and after) the 2007-2008 Great Recession as people opted to make fewer trips to save resources [4] . Rather it is how society and governments respond to a recession (particularly regarding fiscal policy) that has a large impact on their populations.
The impact of austerity on health has been well documented across Europe. Many countries have cut back on their provision of health care [6] or increased costs to patients [8] . Some of these impacts were largely expected, but others, such as HIV outbreaks in Greece due to cuts in preventive measures, were not [5] . These effects have been far reaching to the extent that their impact has not been completely tied to specific austerity measures, with indirect effects also arising through increasing anxiety and poorer well-being, partly associated with the wider political climate [9] . Other impacts such as increasing unemployment, decreasing wage growth in real terms, increasing costs of food and loss of services are difficult to quantify and their effects may only be detected over time.
In Western Europe, the UK embraced austerity to the greatest degree, with widespread cuts to welfare and public services, particularly health care and adult social care. It also experienced its largest annual spike in mortality rates for almost 50 years in 2015 [10] [11] [12] . The majority of these deaths occurred in frail elderly people. This was not just a one-off event and mortality rates have remained almost as high throughout 2016 and into 2017 [13] . Various explanations have been proposed, but each fail to explain the increase -that is, all bar the austerity argument, which becomes even more convincing given the wider impacts of austerity occurring elsewhere [10, 12] . In fact, the magnitude of the increase was so large (estimated to be an additional 39,074 deaths by Green et al. [10] ) that one researcher claimed that they must be due to a new undiscovered disease because this was a more plausible explanation [14] .
The experience in the UK is unique, but not too dissimilar to what we see across Western Europe. There is a positive correlation (r = 0.49) so that the countries with a growth in the size of the state saw larger increases in life expectancy over this period. Both Finland and norway maintained their levels of social spending, resulting in the preservation of their strong welfare states; unsurprisingly, they experienced the largest increase in life expectancy over this period.
These trends in life expectancy are unprecedented. The great success of the twentieth century was the continual improvement in population health. In the UK, the estimated life expectancy in 1800 was 38.6 years and had increased to 46.3 years in 1900 (although the modal age of death was 68 years). Contrast this with the experience 100 years later, when life expectancy had shot up to 77.8 years by 2000 [15] . The average change in life expectancy of the countries in Figure 1 That being said, the argument could be made that the UK, Finland and norway are clear outliers. Removing them produces a correlation of r = −0.60, suggesting that austerity is beneficial to population health. Understanding the uncertainty in the responses of countries to austerity programmes is important. The drivers of trends in life expectancy and health often operate on long timescales and it may take several years or decades to truly understand the effects of austerity.
One common explanation for the decreasing gains in life expectancy is that we are starting to witness the impacts of 'ageing populations'. A greater share of most affluent nation's population are aged 65+ years and it is plausible that because ill-health is concentrated in elderly people such a population shift may impact on population health. However, such an impact is often overstated [16] . The post-war baby boomers in the UK had not reached the ages where mortality rates increase the most [10] . It also misappropriates the underlying cause of trends because, although a greater proportion of elderly populations may increase demand on health services, issues will only arise if services are underfunded.
Focusing solely on these national-level trends conceals within-country differences in health. Many cutbacks were targeted at services and social provisions that vulnerable groups -such as ethnic minorities, disabled people and poor people -depend on [9] . There is emerging evidence of these effects taking hold. Despite long-term decreases in infant mortality, trends have now reversed for manual occupational groups in the UK [17] . There has been decreasing mental health among insecure employees and unemployed people in Spain [18] and Sweden [19] , which may be partly explained by housing worries, such as the financial strain of rent/mortgage payments [20] . Austerity has also increased the level of social inequality for access to medical care in Greece [21] . However, there is a paucity of evidence and we need greater insights into how austerity affects different populations as new data become available. In particular, much of the current evidence base is derived from repeated cross-sectional data and there is a need for longitudinal analyses to separate out the causes and effects of the impact of austerity.
Any investigation of social inequalities should not focus purely on the bottom of society. The social gradient operates throughout the whole social distribution. Austerity measures are not always targeted solely at the most vulnerable in society (even if that is where they are concentrated), but are also affecting the middle classes. What was surprising about the jump in mortality rates observed in England and Wales was that they occurred everywhere, in both affluent and poorer areas [10] . Austerity harms everyone -when you are frail and dependent on others, your income matters less if the support you need has been cut back in availability or quality.
Despite the early evidence of changing trends in population health (and other associated impacts of austerity), austerity remains the primary policy discourse in many countries. In fact, the economic argument for austerity is in tatters. Those countries that responded with stimulus (e.g. the USA and Iceland) saw their economies grow more than those who opted for austerity [5, 9] . Even the International Monetary Fund, once in favour of austerity, is now arguing that austerity does more harm than good [22] . The emergence of new populist movements in some countries under an antiausterity banner has begun to gain some traction, particularly among younger populations. But it does provoke some troubling questions about the extent to which governments will continue with austerity. Evidence no longer seems to matter to the proponents of austerity [9] .
These trends in health and mortality raise questions about what the future holds for trends in population health. The epidemiological transition theory of Omran [23] predicted that mortality rates might fluctuate in post-industrial societies. It now seems possible that we might be entering a new age of population health characterised by an instability of population health largely dictated by the social and political determinants of health. Only time will tell if this is true; it has almost been a decade since the 2007-2008 Great Recession. There is still time for governments to intervene and avoid a sustained period of decreasing life expectancy.
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